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“Death by a Thousand Paper Cuts”1 – How the 
Kansas Supreme Court Should Stop the State 




America’s founders sought a moderate government that could prevent 
individual tyrants or extreme political factions from seizing power.2  They 
feared political factions would wield the power of the government to 
benefit themselves, while harming the community as a whole and 
infringing on weaker individuals’ rights.3  As protection against both 
singular tyrants and tyrannical political factions, the founders explicitly 
protected important individual rights in the Constitution and devised our 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Kansas School of Law; B.A., 2013, Accounting and Finance, 
University of Kansas.  Thank you to my wonderful wife and children for their constant support and 
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Buchanan and Mary Kate Workman, along with staff editors Parker Bednasek, Noelle Daniel, Katie 
Deutsch, and Cayce Good, for their thorough review of this Comment; any errors are mine. 
 1.   Johnson v. U.S. Food Serv., 427 P.3d 996, 1009 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018) (“The gradual erosion 
of the fair exchange between rights under the Act and common-law rights to tort recovery have, for 
the injured worker, amounted to death by a thousand paper cuts.”),  
cert. granted, No. 117725, 2019 Kan. LEXIS 140, at *1 (Kan. Feb. 28, 2019).   
The Kansas Supreme Court held oral arguments for Johnson on 
 September 17, 2020.   Kansas Supreme Court, 117,725 - JOHNSON v. U.S. FOODS - Sept. 17th - 11 
AM, YOUTUBE (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o49t-
XaxGiw&ab_channel=KansasSupremeCourt [https://perma.cc/6MTP-YFKS] Oral arguments were 
broadcast live and recorded on the Kansas Supreme Court’s YouTube channel due to COVID-19 
procedure.  Id. 
 2.   THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (“Among the numerous advantages promised by 
a wellconstructed [sic] Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to 
break and control the violence of faction.”); Alexander Hamilton, Constitutional Convention: Remarks 
on the Term of Office for Members of the Second Branch of the Legislature (June 26, 1787) (“Real 
liberty is neither found in despotism or the extremes of democracy, but in moderate governments.”). 
 3.   See id. (discussing methods to limit extreme factions, which Madison defined as “a majority 
or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of 
interest, adversed [sic] to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of 
the community”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“In a society under the forms of which 
the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as 
in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger”). 
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well-known system of checks and balances.4  The judiciary serves as a 
firewall should an overzealous legislature infringe on its citizens’ 
constitutional rights.5  Kansans used this same framework when crafting 
their state constitution.6 
Since Kansas entered the Union in 1861, its judiciary has given the 
Kansas Legislature—consistently dominated by one political party7—
great deference by applying some form of rational basis review8 when 
plaintiffs challenge a statute’s constitutionality.9  Many Kansans’ opinions 
on the wisdom of this judicial deference likely turn on their political 
affiliation.  Regardless of personal political ideology, most agree that at 
times in Kansas’s history, objectively extreme political factions controlled 
its legislature.10  Kansas strayed far from the “moderate government” the 
founders sought.11  Judicial deference, combined with extreme political 
factions, allowed infringement of individual rights, often in the name of 
 
 4.   See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 3 (James Madison) (“But the great security against 
a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who 
administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist 
encroachments of the others.”). 
 5.   See id.  
 6.   See generally KAN. CONST. of 1859.  
 7.   A Brief History of the Kansas Republican Party, KAN. GOP 2 (Apr. 2019), 
https://www.kansas.gop/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ksgop-history.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UVQ-
RKNT] (providing summaries and statistics on Kansas elections from 1860 through 2014 and stating 
that “the Kansas Republican Party has dominated Kansas politics since Kansas gained statehood in 
1861.”). 
 8.   The Kansas Courts often use the term “presumption of constitutionality.”  This term is 
essentially synonymous to a “rational basis standard of review.”  This Comment will use “rational 
basis” throughout for the sake of consistency.  See Richard E. Levy, Constitutional Rights in Kansas 
after Hodes & Nauser, 68 U. KAN. L. REV. 743, 765 (2020) (“[T]he presumption [of constitutionality] 
is a function of the level of scrutiny that applies, rather than a freestanding principle of judicial restraint 
that applies to all forms of legislative action.  In particular, the presumption is a manifestation of 
deferential review under the rational basis test and does not apply under strict scrutiny, in which the 
burden is on the state to show that a law furthers a compelling interest and is necessary and/or narrowly 
tailored to that end.”). 
 9.   Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 527–29 (Kan. 2019) (Stegall, J., concurring) 
(discussing the history of judicial deference to the legislature and stating: “In Kansas, there is 
evidence that we at least acknowledged some form of [high judicial deference] from our earliest days 
as a state.”). 
 10.   See, e.g., Seth C. McKee, Ian Ostrander, & M. V. Hood III, Out of Step and Out of Touch: 
The Matter with Kansas in the 2014 Midterm Election, 15 THE FORUM, 291, 291, 294 (2017) (“In 
recent years the politics of Kansas, with its strong historic ties to the Republican Party, have taken a 
hard right turn.”); Johnson v. U.S. Food Serv., 427 P.3d 996, 1001–02 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting 
past testimony from workers compensation practitioner Jeff Cooper, who stated: “we had some 
moderate Republicans in the Senate that generally were not real eager to disadvantage injured workers 
in the state of Kansas . . . . [I]n  2010 . . . the Kansas Chamber of Commerce made an organized effort 
to get all those moderates replaced on the Senate and with the exception of maybe one moderate 
senator out of Topeka, they were successful”), cert. granted, No. 117725, 2019 Kan. LEXIS 140 at *1 
(Kan. Feb. 28, 2019). 
 11.   See Hamilton, supra note 2.  
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business growth. 
This radically pro-business approach is particularly evident in the 
Kansas Workers Compensation Act.12  In recent decades, maximum 
financial benefits for injured Kansas workers have not kept up with 
inflation and weekly maximum benefits are the third lowest in the 
country.13  As financial benefits dwindled, the Kansas Legislature passed 
numerous amendments that de facto denied benefits for many injured 
workers.14  While often painted as a political issue, this is not left versus 
right.  It is extreme versus moderate.  Corporate lobbyists versus voters.  
Insurance companies versus injured workers.  In this battle, Kansas 
workers are losing. 
When properly administered, workers compensation—often described 
as “The Grand Bargain”15—provides benefits and mitigates risk for both 
employers and injured workers.  Unfortunately for injured workers, the 
current Kansas Workers Compensation Act serves as a broad shield 
against employer liability rather than a mutually beneficial compromise.16  
Over the last thirty years, the Kansas Legislature repeatedly tilted the 
scales against injured workers.17  Kansas courts deferred to the 
Legislature’s judgment and permitted these cuts to workers’ benefits. 
Through its decisions in Hodes & Nauser v. Schmidt18 and Hilburn v. 
Enerpipe Ltd.,19 the Kansas Supreme Court drew a line in the sand 
regarding its deference in applying rational basis review to constitutional 
statutory challenges.  In these two opinions, released just months apart in 
2019, the Kansas Supreme Court employed an increased level of scrutiny 
when reviewing legislative actions that implicated fundamental 
constitutional rights. 
 
 12.   See Tim Alvarez, The 2011 Kansas Workers Compensation Act: Too Sharp a Right Turn?, 
81 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 24, 25 (2012) (noting the new amendments to the Kansas Workers Compensation 
laws are “largely pro-employer”). 
 13.   Kansas weekly maximum benefits rank 48th in the country, with some states’ maximums 
more than doubling Kansas’s.  See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM 
(POMS) DI 52150.045, CHART OF STATES’ MAXIMUM WORKERS’ COMPENSATION  
(WC) BENEFITS (2020), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0452150045 [https://perma.cc/2WTS-
DR37]. For example, Kansas’s maximum weekly payment is $687.00 whereas Iowa’s maximum 
weekly payment is over $1,800. 
 14.   See infra Section II.A.2. 
 15.   SCOTT D. SZYMENDERA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44580, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: 
OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 2 (2020). 
 16.   Alvarez, supra note 12, at 25. 
 17.   See Johnson v. U.S. Food Serv., 427 P.3d 996, 1004–07 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018), cert. granted, 
No. 117725, 2019 Kan. LEXIS 140 at *1 (Kan. Feb. 28, 2019). 
 18.   440 P.3d 461, 502 (Kan. 2019) (holding women have the right to an abortion under Section 
1 of the Kansas Bill of Rights). 
 19.   442 P.3d 509, 524 (Kan. 2019) (holding statutory caps on noneconomic damages in personal 
injury cases per se unconstitutional under Section 5 of the Kansas Bill of Rights). 
264 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
This increased scrutiny may impact a wide range of legislation.  This 
Comment does not delve into all those issues, many of which are highly 
socially and politically divisive.20  Instead, it focuses on how the Kansas 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions may impact something that hurts 
numerous injured workers, regardless of political affiliation: the Kansas 
Workers Compensation Act.21 
This Comment proceeds as follows.  Section II reviews the history of 
Kansas workers compensation, including the Kansas Court of Appeals 
significant 2018 decision in Johnson v. U.S. Food Services.22  Section II 
then summarizes the relevant portions of the Kansas Supreme Court’s 
subsequent 2019 Hodes and Hilburn opinions.  Section III shows how 
Hodes and Hilburn may affect the Kansas Supreme Court’s analysis in 
“right to a remedy” constitutional challenges to the Kansas Workers 
Compensation Act, proposes a new test for reviewing these challenges, 
and presents an alternative method for plaintiffs to challenge workers 
compensation statutes by asserting their inviolate right to a jury trial.  
Finally, Section IV provides a brief summary and conclusion. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Analyzing the Kansas Workers Compensation Act’s future requires a 
look back at its history and the Kansas Supreme Court’s traditional 
standard for reviewing the Act’s constitutionality.  This section provides 
an overview of the Act’s history and brief summaries of the Kansas 
Supreme Court’s recent Hodes and Hilburn decisions. 
A. Kansas Workers Compensation Background 
This subsection outlines the Kansas Workers Compensation Act’s23 
development from its enactment in the early 20th century through its drastic 
1993 overhaul—the last version the Kansas Supreme Court held facially 
constitutional.24  Next, it details amendments by the Legislature that 
slashed injured workers’ benefits over the last decade.  It then explores the 
Kansas Court of Appeals holding in Johnson v. U.S. Food Services25 which 
struck down a recent amendment to the Act as facially unconstitutional.  
 
 20.   For a thorough examination of Hodes & Nauser v. Schmidt and its potential implications, 
see Levy supra note 8. 
 21.   KAN. STAT. ANN.  §§ 44-501–44-5,127 (2018). 
 22.   427 P.3d 996. 
 23.   KAN. STAT. ANN.  §§ 44-501–44-5,127 (2018).  
 24.   Johnson, 427 P.3d at 1009. 
 25.   Id. at 1013.  
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This subsection ends with a summary of the current state of workers 
compensation benefits in Kansas. 
1. History of the Kansas Workers Compensation Act 
Kansas established one of the first comprehensive workers 
compensation schemes in the country in 1911.26  Just three years later, in 
Shade v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., the Kansas Workers 
Compensation Act survived its first constitutional challenge in the Kansas 
Supreme Court.27  The Shade court rejected the argument that workers 
compensation violated an injured worker’s Section 5 right to a jury trial28 
and Section 18 right to remedy29 under the Kansas Bill of Rights.30  The 
Shade opinion comingled Section 5 and Section 18 rights without 
thoroughly analyzing either.31  Instead, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld 
the workers compensation statute—which included an opt-out provision 
for both employers and employees—primarily based on its elective, 
contractual nature.32 
In 1967, the Kansas Legislature eliminated an injured worker’s right 
to recover from a coworker, even for intentional torts such as battery, if 
the injured worker qualified for workers compensation benefits.33  The 
Legislature subsequently mandated Kansas Workers Compensation Act 
coverage for most employers and employees.34  This was not unique to 
Kansas.  Nearly every state eventually adopted workers compensation 
mandates.35  Mandatory coverage negated the “elective nature” rationale 
used by the Kansas Supreme Court in Shade and several subsequent 
cases.36  In response, the Kansas Supreme Court developed a new method 
 
 26.   Id. at 1003. 
 27.   144 P. 249, 249–50 (Kan. 1914). 
 28.   KAN. CONST. BILL OF RTS., § 5 (“The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate.”). 
 29.   Id. § 18 (“All persons, for injuries suffered in person, reputation or property, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without delay.”). 
 30.   Shade, 144 P. at 249–50.  
 31.   See id. at 249; Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1143 (Kan. 2012) (Beier, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part), abrogated by Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d at 521 (Kan. 2019). 
 32.   Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 535 (Luckert, J., dissenting) (discussing Shade).  
 33.   Rajala v. Doresky, 661 P.2d 1251, 1252, 1254 (Kan. 1983) (upholding KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 
44-501, 44-504(a) (1967)). 
 34.   Johnson v. U.S. Food Serv., 427 P.3d 996, 1004 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018), cert. granted, No. 
117725, 2019 Kan. LEXIS 140 at *1 (Kan. Feb. 28, 2019).  Some agricultural workers, firefighters, 
real estate professionals, and people employed by family members are exempt from the Act.  KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 44-505(a) (2018). 
 35.   Szymendera, supra note 15, at 1. 
 36.   Shade, 144 P. at 250; Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 518 (citing Baker v. St. Louis Smelting & 
Refining Co., 65 P.2d 284, 288 (Kan. 1937)); Potocan v. Hamilton Coal & Mercantile Co., 243 P. 537, 
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for assessing the constitutionality of Kansas workers compensation, 
commonly known as the quid pro quo test. 
In Rajala v. Doresky, the plaintiff argued that the 1967 amendment 
barring tort actions against coworkers violated his Section 18 right to a 
remedy.37  Rajala’s coworker intentionally struck and injured him during 
his shift at a restaurant.38  Because Rajala could recover workers 
compensation benefits, the 1967 amendment barred a personal injury 
claim against his coworker.39  The Kansas Supreme Court rejected 
Rajala’s Section 18 right to a remedy argument.40  Although the Kansas 
Workers Compensation Act eliminated common law tort remedies, the 
Rajala court held that the Act provided injured workers a sufficient 
substitute statutory remedy.41  In other words, the Legislature can strip 
away a common law remedy, like a worker’s right to sue their employer 
in tort.  But to do so without running afoul of Section 18, the Legislature 
must provide citizens a quid pro quo in the form of a sufficient alternative 
remedy for their injuries, like adequate workers compensation benefits.  
The Kansas Supreme Court would later adopt this quid pro quo analysis 
as one half of a two-part test applied in constitutional challenges to the 
Act. 
The Act went mostly untouched for several decades until the 
Legislature overhauled it in 1993.42  This overhaul included numerous 
amendments that reduced the likelihood of an injured worker obtaining 
benefits and lowered the monetary value of the benefits they did receive.43  
Before these amendments, employers offset workers compensation 
benefits dollar for dollar for any Social Security retirement benefits an 
injured worker received.44  Under the 1993 Amendments, employers could 
also offset against workers compensation benefits “the employer’s 
contribution (and apparently the earnings thereon) to any private 
 
538–39 (Kan. 1926) (noting prior decisions “balked and hesitated at those statutes which were 
compulsory”); Smith v. Cudahy Packing Co., 225 P. 110, 111 (Kan. 1924) (“Having decided that the 
statutes are, in fact, optional, and afford a voluntary election to accept or reject them, the entire 
problem is solved.”). 
 37.   661 P.2d at 1252–53. 
 38.   Id. at 1252. 
 39.   Id. at 1254. 
 40.   Id. at 1253.  
 41.   Id. at 1253–54. 
 42.   Johnson v. U.S. Food Serv., 427 P.3d 996, 1004 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018), cert. granted, No. 
117725, 2019 Kan. LEXIS 140 at *1 (Kan. Feb. 28, 2019). 
 43.   Id. at 1004–05. 
 44.   Nicole M. Zomberg, Comment, Workers Compensation Law: Constitutionality of the 1993 
Kansas Workers Compensation Act, 37 WASHBURN L. J. 829, 835, 845–46 (1998); Johnson, 427 P.3d 
at 1005. 
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retirement plan.”45  The Legislature also eliminated an injured worker’s 
right to vocational rehabilitation treatment, which helps workers return to 
gainful employment after an injury.46 
For the first time in the history of the Act, “the legislature disallowed 
recovery for the aggravation of a preexisting injury even though the 
aggravation of the injury was due to a work-related activity.”47  Prior to 
1993, injured workers were taken in their condition at the time of the 
accident, and the Act did not impose a standard of health.48  It was “well 
settled that an accidental injury is compensable where the accident only 
serves to aggravate or accelerate an existing disease or intensifies the 
affliction.”49  The Legislature extinguished benefits for numerous workers 
with preexisting conditions by amending the Act to state that “[a]n injury 
is not compensable because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.  
An injury is not compensable solely because it aggravates, accelerates or 
exacerbates a preexisting condition or renders a preexisting condition 
symptomatic.”50  The 1993 amendments included multiple other changes 
that limited payments to injured workers.51 
These amendments survived a Section 18 “right to a remedy” 
challenge in Injured Workers of Kansas v. Franklin.52  The Kansas 
Supreme Court developed a two-part test that would later become known 
as the Injured Workers test: “(1) Is the legislative change reasonably 
necessary in the public interest to promote the general welfare of the state?  
(2) Has the Legislature provided an adequate substitute remedy to replace 
the remedy that was restricted?”53 
The Injured Workers court answered “yes” to part one under a rational 
basis standard of review, where “[t]he state legislature is presumed to have 
acted within its constitutional power” and a statute “will not be set aside if 
any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”54  Part two of 
the Injured Workers test employed the quid pro quo analysis from Rajala, 
which asks whether an alternative remedy, provided by the Legislature in 
exchange for stripping citizens’ rights to a common law remedy, is 
 
 45.   Johnson, 427 P.3d at 1005. 
 46.   Id. 
 47.   Injured Workers of Kan. v. Franklin, 942 P.2d 591, 620 (Kan. 1997). 
 48.   Strasser v. Jones, 350 P.2d 779, 782 (Kan. 1960). 
 49.   Id. (citing numerous prior Kansas Supreme Court decisions). 
 50.   KAN. STAT. ANN.  § 44-508(f)(2) (2018). 
 51.   See Johnson, 427 P.3d at 1004–05. 
 52.   942 P.2d at 622–23.  
 53.   Johnson, 427 P.3d at 1005 (citing Injured Workers, 942 P.2d at 603), cert. granted, No. 
117725, 2019 Kan. LEXIS 140, at *1 (Kan. Feb. 28, 2019). 
 54.   Injured Workers, 942 P.2d at 599 (quoting Leiker v. Gafford, 778 P.2d 823, 849 (Kan. 
1989)). 
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sufficient.55 
While a few of the 1993 amendments benefited workers, the Kansas 
Supreme Court recognized that “the expansion [of worker benefits] pales 
in comparison to what was taken away.”56  However, the court analyzed 
the entire Act as one quid pro quo, instead of isolating the 1993 
amendments.57  Once a statutory scheme is considered an adequate 
substitute remedy—as the Kansas Workers Compensation Act was in 
Rajala—the Legislature may subsequently reduce the substitute remedy 
without providing an “independent and separate quid pro quo.”58  These 
subsequent reductions do have an outer limit.  “The legislature, once 
having established a substitute remedy, cannot constitutionally proceed to 
[weaken] the remedy, by amendments, to a point where it is no longer a 
viable and sufficient substitute remedy.”59 
Despite recognizing that the 1993 amendments heavily favored 
employers, the Injured Workers court held that the Act in its totality was 
still an adequate quid pro quo.60  The majority explained its quid pro quo 
analysis by simply pointing out “[t]he amended Act still provides 
compensation for injured workers without proof of negligence or fault, a 
benefit not allowed under typical tort law.”61 
In a concise dissent, Justice Allegrucci argued that Kansas workers 
compensation was no longer an adequate quid pro quo for workers and 
stated that he could not “determine at what point, if any, the majority 
would conclude the legislature went too far in altering a substitute 
remedy.”62  Despite numerous subsequent amendments that undermine the 
majority’s justification, the Kansas Supreme Court has not ruled on the 
constitutionality of the Kansas Workers Compensation Act since its 1997 
Injured Workers opinion.63 
 
 55.   Id. at 619–23. 
 56.   Johnson, 427 P.3d at 1005 (citing Injured Workers, 942 P.2d at 623). 
 57.   Injured Workers, 942 P.2d at 621. 
 58.   Id. (quoting Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176, 1189–90 (Kan. 1991)). 
 59.   Injured Workers, 942 P.2d at 622 (quoting Bair, 811 P.2d at 1191).  Kansas judicial 
opinions, including Injured Workers and Bair, have commonly utilized the term “emasculate” to 
describe something being weakened.  Given the clearly misogynistic implication of using 
“emasculate” in this context, this Comment uses “weaken” in its place. 
 60.   See id. at 623.  
 61.   Id.  
 62.   Id. at 623–24 (Allegrucci, J., dissenting). 
 63.   Johnson v. U.S. Food Serv., 427 P.3d 996, 1009 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018), cert. granted, No. 
117725, 2019 Kan. LEXIS 140 at *1 (Kan. Feb. 28, 2019). 
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2. Subsequent Amendments to the Kansas Workers Compensation Act 
In 2011, the Kansas Legislature either amended or repealed twenty-
eight sections of the Act.64  Once again, the 2011 amendments strongly 
favored employers by further restricting injured workers’ chances of 
obtaining benefits and reducing the benefits that they could receive.65  
Kansas courts historically said the Act’s primary purpose was to protect 
injured workers, and its provisions must be construed liberally in favor of 
providing benefits whenever reasonably possible.66  In 2011, the 
Legislature did not even attempt to hide that it was flipping the Act’s 
purpose to favor employers and their insurance companies.  The 
Legislature shifted the focus of the Act’s first section “from compensation 
for injured workers to disallowances and reductions [for employers] 
predicated on fault-based concepts familiar to tort law.”67  The first 
section’s title now explicitly includes “disallowances; substance abuse 
testing; exceptions, pre-existing conditions; . . . benefits reduced for 
certain retirement benefits.”68  Perhaps most damning for workers, the 
Legislature adopted the prevailing factor standard, which imposed a fault-
based burden of proof on injured workers and doubled down on stripping 
benefits from people with preexisting conditions.69 
Under the prevailing factor standard, an injured worker must prove a 
workplace accident or repetitive trauma was the “primary factor, in 
relation to any other factor”70 that caused their “medical condition and 
resulting disability or impairment.”71  An administrative law judge 
considers “all relevant evidence submitted by the parties,” then applies the 
prevailing factor standard, which closely resembles the causation analysis 
in a common law tort action.72  Injured workers bear the burden of proving 
the absence of a preexisting condition and the primary cause of their 
 
 64.   Alvarez, supra note 12, at 25. 
 65.   Id. 
 66.   See Mendel v. Fort Scott Hydraulic Cement Co., 78 P.2d 868, 876 (Kan. 1938) (noting the 
purpose of workers compensation “is to make certain the workmen will be protected”); Houston v. 
Kansas Highway Patrol, 708 P.2d 533, 536 (Kan. 1985) (noting if the statute is ambiguous, claims 
should be resolved in favor of the worker), overruled on unrelated grounds by Murphy v. IBP Inc., 
727 P.2d 468 (Kan. 1986); Bahr v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 663 P.2d 1144, 1149 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1983) (“As a general rule, the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act are to be liberally 
construed in favor of the worker, and compensation awarded where it is reasonably possible to do 
so.”) (citing Ours v. Lackey, 515 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Kan. 1973)). 
 67.   Johnson, 427 P.3d at 1005. 
 68.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (2011). 
 69.   See Alvarez, supra note 12, at 26. 
 70.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-508(g) (2011). 
 71.   Id. § 44-508(f)(2)(A)(iii) (2011). 
 72.   Alvarez, supra note 12, at 26; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-508(g) (2011). 
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injury.73  The prevailing factor standard eliminates compensation for 
“many injuries that were previously compensable as workers 
compensation injuries.”74 
Before the 2011 amendments, injured workers’ rights to compensation 
for medical treatment reasonably necessary as a result of their injury were 
not limited in amount or restricted in time.75  Now, administrative law 
judges cannot award compensation for future medical treatment unless an 
injured worker proves, at the time of the submission of the case, their need 
for the future treatment is more probable than not, which typically requires 
medical expert testimony.76  Because medical experts frequently struggle 
with predicting treatment needs in the distant future, this amendment made 
it more difficult for injured workers to obtain compensation for healthcare 
costs stemming from a workplace injury.77  Additionally, an employer can 
now get an injured worker’s claim dismissed with prejudice for lack of 
prosecution if the claim does not reach trial or settlement within three 
years, instead of the five years previously afforded to workers.78 
Traditionally, Kansas recognized benefits for work disability if those 
benefits exceed the standard functional impairment calculation.  Post-
injury wage loss, a key factor in calculating work disability benefits, was 
defined as the difference between a worker’s wage at the time of injury 
and their actual post-injury wages.79  After the 2011 amendments, instead 
of using actual post-injury wages, an administrative law judge determines 
a worker’s potential post-injury wages based on factors including the 
worker’s “age, physical capabilities, education and training, prior 
experience, and availability of jobs in the open labor market.”80  
Additionally, a permanently injured worker now must prove more than a 
7.5 percent functional impairment to their whole person or they cannot 
obtain work disability benefits under K.S.A. § 44-510e.81 
The 2011 Amendments included modest increases to the maximum 
 
 73.   Johnson v. U.S. Food Serv., 427 P.3d 996, 1005–06 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018), cert. granted, 
No. 117725, 2019 Kan. LEXIS 140, at *1 (Kan. Feb. 28, 2019). 
 74.   Alvarez, supra note 12, at 26. 
 75.   Johnson, 427 P.3d at 1006. 
 76.   Id.; Alvarez, supra note 12, at 28. 
 77.   Johnson, 427 P.3d at 1006. 
 78.   KAN. DEP’T OF LAB. DIVISION OF WORKERS COMPENSATION PRAC. & PROC. GUIDE, at 38 
(2018) (noting for accidents occurring prior to May 2011, workers have five years from the date of 
filing before their claim can be dismissed for lack of prosecution) (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-
523(f) (Supp. 2006)). 
 79.   Johnson, 427 P.3d at 1006 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-510e). 
 80.   Alvarez, supra note 12, at 27. 
 81.   Id.; Johnson, 427 P.3d at 1006 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-510e (2011)). 
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benefit caps for injured workers, the first since 1993.82  But, after 
accounting for inflation, today, some maximums still sit more than thirty 
percent lower than their 1993 counterparts.83 
When the 2011 Amendments were enacted, the Act required use of the 
Fourth Edition of the American Medical Association Guides (“Fourth 
Edition”) when calculating an injured worker’s impairment.84  The Fourth 
Edition assigns significantly higher impairment percentages to most 
injuries than its Sixth Edition counterpart, which equals higher monetary 
benefits for an injured worker.85  As a concession to pro-labor advocates 
leading up to the 2011 Amendments, the Kansas Legislature agreed it 
would not amend the Act to require use of the Sixth Edition.86  In 2013, 
just two years after this agreement, the Kansas Legislature amended the 
Act to require use of the Sixth Edition.87 
The significance of this change lies in the different methods the Fourth 
Edition and Sixth Edition use to calculate impairment.  Logically 
connected to workers compensation, the Fourth Edition calculates injuries 
based on impairments that reduce an injured worker’s ability to work.88  In 
contrast, the Sixth Edition impairment calculation is primarily based on 
life-care activities like “bathing, showering, dressing, eating, functional 
mobility, personal hygiene, toilet hygiene and management, sleep, and 
sexual activity.”89  On average, Sixth Edition “impairment ratings are 40% 
to 70% lower than those provided in the Fourth Edition.”90 
3. Johnson v. U.S. Food Service 
A few months after the Sixth Edition calculation requirement took 
effect, Howard Johnson suffered a workplace neck injury, and filed a claim 
 
 82.   Alvarez, supra note 12, at 27. 
 83.   Id.; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-510f(a)(1) (2011); Id. § 44-510b (2018); CPI Inflation 
Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl, (last visited Aug. 25, 
2020).  For example, in 1993, the maximum compensation for a permanent total disability was 
$125,000.  $125,000 in 1993 provided the same buying power as $225,000 in 2020.  Yet in 2020, the 
maximum compensation for a permanent total disability is only $155,000.  Alvarez, supra note 12, at 
27.  This disparity will grow with each passing year the Legislature fails to increase benefits for injured 
workers. 
 84.   Johnson v. U.S. Food Serv., 427 P.3d 996, 1007 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018), cert. granted, No. 
117725, 2019 Kan. LEXIS 140, at *1 (Kan. Feb. 28, 2019). 
 85.   Id. at 1007–08. 
 86.   Id. at 1002. 
 87.   Id. 
 88.   See id. at 1011. 
 89.   Id. (citing CHRISTOPHER R. BRIGHAM, AMA GUIDES – SIXTH EDITION: EVOLVING 
CONCEPTS, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, AM. MED. ASS’N, 12 (2011) 
https://www.6thedition.com/training/sixtheditionsyllabus2008-01-23.pdf.)). 
 90.   Johnson, 427 P.3d at 1012. 
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for workers compensation benefits.91  Applying the Sixth Edition, an 
administrative law judge awarded Johnson less than $15,000 in total 
workers compensation benefits, a paltry sum compared to the nearly 
$62,000 he would have received under the Fourth Edition.92  Johnson 
appealed, claiming use of the Sixth Edition made the Kansas Workers 
Compensation Act an  unconstitutional violation of his Section 18 right to 
a remedy.93  He argued the Act no longer provided an adequate quid pro 
quo for its elimination of injured workers’ rights to bring a common law 
action against their employer.94 
The Kansas Court of Appeals followed what, at the time, was 
longstanding Kansas Supreme Court precedent and applied a rational basis 
standard of review.95  Under this standard of review, the Court of Appeals 
must “interpret a statute in a way that makes it constitutional if there is any 
reasonable construction that would maintain the Legislature’s apparent 
intent.”96 
The Kansas Court of Appeals then applied the same two-part test used 
by the Kansas Supreme Court in Injured Workers: “(1) Is the change in the 
Act reasonably necessary in the public interest to promote the general 
welfare of the people of Kansas?  (2) Does the Act in its current form 
provide an adequate [quid pro quo] . . . ?”97  The Kansas Court of Appeals 
held that the amendment passed part one’s very low bar without providing 
much analysis because Johnson’s argument focused on part two.98 
In part two of the Injured Workers test, the Kansas Court of Appeals 
held that adoption of the Sixth Edition surpassed the limit that prevents the 
Legislature “once having established a substitute remedy” from 
proceeding “to [weaken] the remedy, by amendments, to a point where it 
is no longer a viable and sufficient substitute remedy.”99  The court noted 
that the erosion of workers compensation benefits after Injured Workers 
“amounted to death by a thousand paper cuts” for injured Kansas 
workers.100  The court quoted former Kansas Secretary of State Kris 
Kobach, who, despite being generally considered an ultra-conservative 
 
 91.   Id. at 1000. 
 92.   Id. at 1001.  
 93.   Id. at 1002. 
 94.   Id. 
 95.   Id.  
 96.   Id. (emphasis added) (citing Solomon v. State, 364 P.3d 536, 544 (Kan. 2015)). 
 97.   Johnson, 427 P.3d at 1008 (citing Injured Workers of Kan. v. Franklin, 942 P.2d 591 (Kan. 
1997)). 
 98.   Johnson, 427 P.3d at 1008.   
 99.   Id. at 1004 (quoting Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176, 1191 (Kan. 1991)). 
 100.   Johnson, 427 P.3d at 1009. 
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and pro-business politician,101 opposed using the Sixth Edition.102  Kobach 
had previously explained that the Sixth Edition provided “zero 
compensation” for certain injury classes and reduced others “to 
pathetically inadequate compensation levels, by anyone’s reckoning.”103  
Kobach further stated that, “Kansas is now the only state in the union that 
combines the 6th Edition with the prevailing-factor rule.  That puts Kansas 
in a class by itself, and it results in a denial of due process to Kansas 
workers.”104 
While not at issue in Johnson, the Kansas Court of Appeals noted that 
the 2011 amendments alone may have pushed the Kansas Workers 
Compensation Act to the unconstitutional tipping point.105  Despite 
granting the Legislature the massive leeway of rational basis review, the 
Kansas Court of Appeals held that use of the Sixth Edition made the Act 
an insufficient quid pro quo and facially unconstitutional.106  Because the 
Act contains a severability clause, this holding did not invalidate Kansas 
workers compensation in its entirety.107  Instead, the Court of Appeals 
decision only struck the 2013 amendment adopting the Sixth Edition and 
required immediate reversion to the Fourth Edition.108 
4. Current State of Workers Compensation in Kansas 
Financial benefits available to injured workers in Kansas have not kept 
pace with inflation and are much lower than most other states.109  
Regardless of a worker’s pre-injury income, wage replacement benefits 
are capped at $687 per week or $35,724 per year.110  This cap ranks forty-
eighth among states and is less than two-thirds of the national average, 
which is nearly $54,000 per year.111  As an example of a specific injury 
cap, the national average maximum compensation for an arm injury is 
 
 101.   See Kris Kobach, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Kris_Kobach 
[https://perma.cc/33CQ-RU89 ] (last updated Jan. 2019). 
 102.   Johnson, 427 P.3d at 1007. 
 103.   Id. 
 104.   Id. 
 105.   Id. at 1009. 
 106.   Id. at 1009–13. 
 107.   Id. at 1013–14. 
 108.   Id. at 1014 (striking KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-510d(b)(23)–(b)(24), 44-510e(a)(2)(B)).  
 109.   See Jeanine Skowronski, Hurt on the Job? A State-by-State Guide to Workers’ 
Compensation, POLICYGENIUS (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.policygenius.com/blog/state-by-state-
guide-to-workers-compensation/ [https://perma.cc/5YBZ-C9JJ]; see also supra notes 82–83 and 
accompanying text. 
 110.   See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 13. 
 111.   See id. (annual national average calculated based on monthly maximums as of Aug. 25, 
2020).  
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approximately $170,000.112  However, if a Kansas worker loses an arm 
due to employer negligence, the worker’s maximum recovery from their 
employer’s insurance company is $75,000.113  Under most workers 
compensation schemes, “[t]o assist beneficiaries’ return to work and 
departure from the workers’ compensation rolls, vocational rehabilitation 
services are provided.”114  Yet, in Kansas, employers and their insurance 
companies get to choose whether or not to offer an injured worker 
vocational rehabilitation services.115 
The Kansas Workers Compensation Act has “shifted its focus from 
compensation for injured workers to disallowances and reductions 
predicated on fault-based concepts familiar to tort law.”116  Injured 
workers bear the burden of proving their “right to an award of 
compensation and . . . the various conditions on which [their] right 
depends.”117  Injured workers must show that “a work-related accident or 
repetitive trauma was the primary factor in causing their injury.”118  Even 
if an injured worker meets this prevailing factor standard, employers have 
a number of defenses at their disposal including stricter drug testing 
requirements, notice requirements, and provisions that act as statutes of 
limitations.119 
B. Recent Shift in Constitutional Scrutiny by the Kansas Supreme Court 
This subsection reviews two opinions, released months apart in 2019, 
where the Kansas Supreme Court diverted from its traditional deferential 
approach in cases raising constitutional challenges to state statutes.  The 
heightened standard of review established for statutes that implicate 
fundamental constitutional rights may significantly impact future 
challenges to the Kansas Workers Compensation Act. 
1. Hodes & Nauser v. Schmidt 
In 2015, the Kansas Legislature enacted a bill preventing doctors from 
 
 112.   Lena Groeger, Michael Grabell & Cynthia Cotts, Workers’ Comp Benefits: How Much is a 
Limb Worth?, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 5, 2015), https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/workers-
compensation-benefits-by-limb#Kansas [https://perma.cc/KD8F-NPJ4].  
 113.   Id.  
 114.   Szymendera, supra note 15, at 17. 
 115.   Johnson v. U.S. Food Serv., 427 P.3d 996, 1005 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018), cert. granted, No. 
117725, 2019 Kan. LEXIS 140 (Kan. Feb. 28, 2019). 
 116.   Id. 
 117.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501b(c) (2011). 
 118.   Johnson, 427 P.3d at 1005–06. 
 119.   Id. at 1006, 1009–10. 
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employing a widely used abortion procedure, except in a few narrow 
circumstances.120  Physicians Herbert C. Hodes and Traci Lynn Nauser 
administered this abortion procedure in Kansas and claimed the bill 
prevented them from providing the safest second-trimester abortion 
procedure available.121  Hodes and Nauser argued that banning the 
procedure violated their patients’ inalienable natural rights, including the 
right to liberty, protected under Section 1 of the Kansas Bill of Rights.122  
Section 1 provides that “all [people] are possessed of equal and inalienable 
natural rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.”123 
The Kansas Supreme Court agreed that Section 1 rights include “a 
woman’s right to make decisions about her body, including the decision 
whether to continue her pregnancy.”124  The majority looked at common 
law history and the understanding of Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees 
prior to 1859 to interpret the Kansas Constitution drafters’ intent for 
Section 1.125  Although the right to an abortion procedure is not absolute, 
the court declared it a fundamental, natural right which must be reviewed 
under a heightened strict scrutiny standard.126  Strict scrutiny means “the 
State is prohibited from restricting that right unless it can show it is doing 
so to further a compelling government interest and in a way that is 
narrowly tailored to that interest.”127  The Kansas Supreme Court upheld 
the district court’s temporary injunction enjoining enforcement of the 
statute because Hodes and Nauser demonstrated a substantial likelihood 
that the bill would be held unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny 
analysis.128 
Justice Stegall led off his dissenting opinion in Hodes by positing that 
the majority had issued the “most significant and far-reaching decision 
 
 120.   Hodes & Nauser v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 466 (Kan. 2019) (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
64-6743(a) (2015)). 
 121.   Hodes, at 466–67. 
 122.   Id. at 467. 
 123.   KAN. CONST. BILL OF RTS., § 1.  Not surprisingly, given when it was drafted, Section 1 uses 
the word “men.”  Id.  The Hodes majority dedicated a portion of its opinion to clarifying that Section 
1 guarantees women the same inalienable rights as men.  Hodes, 440 P.3d at 483–84.  Justice Stegall 
agreed in his dissent and argued that, at the time the Kansas Constitution was drafted, the use of the 
term “men” in this context was “understood as a generic term for all humankind.”  Id. at 523 (Stegall, 
J., dissenting).  Regardless of the drafters’ intent, this Comment uses the more inclusive term, 
“people.” 
 124.   Hodes, 440 P.3d at 466. 
 125.   Id. at 472–73. 
 126.   Id. at 502. 
 127.   Id.  
 128.   Id. at 502–03. 
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[the Kansas Supreme Court] has ever made.”129  Justice Stegall framed his 
dissent as being not just about abortion policy, but rather a general 
disagreement with the Kansas Supreme Court only protecting judicially 
and politically “preferred” rights  with strict scrutiny.130  Justice Stegall 
argued the court should review legislative infringements on constitutional 
rights under a slightly elevated “rational basis with bite” standard of 
review.131  Ultimately, the majority’s strict scrutiny approach prevailed 
and influenced the outcome in Hilburn. 
2. Hilburn v. Enerpipe, Ltd. 
In Hilburn, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the statutory caps on 
noneconomic damages in personal injury cases were per se 
unconstitutional.132  A semi-truck rear-ended the car Ms. Hilburn was in 
and injured her.133  Hilburn alleged the truck driver’s negligence caused 
the accident and sued Enerpipe, Ltd., the truck’s owner.134  Enerpipe 
conceded both the driver’s negligence and their vicarious liability.135  The 
case went to trial to determine damages.  At trial, the jury awarded Hilburn 
approximately $33,500 for medical expenses and $301,500 for 
noneconomic losses.136  Upon a motion from Enerpipe, the trial court 
reduced the noneconomic damages award to the $250,000 statutory cap.137 
Hilburn appealed, arguing that the statutory cap on noneconomic 
damages infringed on her Section 5 right to a trial by jury.138  Hilburn also 
contended that the legislature had not provided an adequate substitute 
remedy for its infringement of her Section 18 right to a remedy, making 
the statute an insufficient quid pro quo.139  Because her Section 5 claim 
was dispositive, the court did not address Hilburn’s Section 18 claim.140 
In Hodes, the Kansas Supreme Court established a higher standard of 
review for “cases dealing with ‘fundamental interests’ protected by the 
Kansas Constitution.”141  The Hilburn court said it was clear that the 
 
 129.   Id. at 517 (Stegall, J., dissenting). 
 130.   Id. at 556. 
 131.   Id. at 550–51. 
 132.   Hilburn v. Enerpipe, Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 511 (Kan. 2019). 
 133.   Id. 
 134.   Id. 
 135.   Id. 
 136.   Id. 
 137.   Id.; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02(d) (2014). 
 138.   Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 511; KAN. CONST. BILL OF RTS., § 5. 
 139.   Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 511–12; KAN. CONST. BILL OF RTS., § 18. 
 140.   Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 524.  
 141.   Id. at 513 (citing Hodes & Nauser v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 495–99 (Kan. 2019)). 
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Section 5 right to a jury trial is fundamental under the Kansas Bill of 
Rights.142  Therefore, the court followed the precedent from Hodes and 
refused to “apply [rational basis review] to challenges brought under 
Section 5.”143 
After determining a higher standard of review applied, the Kansas 
Supreme Court found that the statutory caps on noneconomic damages in 
personal injury cases infringed on the right to trial by jury, which is 
“inviolate” under the Kansas Bill of Rights.144  After emphasizing the 
importance of the word “inviolate”, the Kansas Supreme Court refused to 
continue its past practice of applying a quid pro quo test to Section 5 
challenges and held that the statutory noneconomic damage caps in 
personal injury cases were per se unconstitutional.145  The Kansas 
Supreme Court’s application of the heightened standard of review in 
Hilburn to Section 5 rights and statutory caps on noneconomic damages 
shows that Hodes may impact a wide range of constitutional challenges.  
Section 18 “right to a remedy” challenges to the Kansas Workers 
Compensation Act could be next. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Hodes, Hilburn, and the Right to a Remedy 
 
This section first explores how Hodes and Hilburn may affect Section 
18 “right to a remedy” challenges to the Kansas Workers Compensation 
Act and suggests a new two-part test for analyzing these challenges.  Then, 
this section proposes an alternate path for future injured Kansas workers 
to challenge the Act by asserting their inviolate right to a jury trial under 
Section 5 Workers Compensation Challenges After Hodes and Hilburn. 
In Hodes, the Kansas Supreme Court profoundly shifted constitutional 
jurisprudence in Kansas by increasing the level of scrutiny it applies when 
the Legislature infringes on Kansans’ fundamental constitutional rights.146  
While two justices disagreed with the five-justice Hodes majority on the 
correct level of scrutiny, the court unanimously agreed the case called for 
something higher than rational basis review.147  After this unanimous 
support for an elevated level of scrutiny, it is unlikely the court will shift 
 
 142.   Id. at 513. 
 143.   Id. 
 144.   Id. at 524. 
 145.   Id. at 515–19 (noting “none of the Kansas cases . . . using the quid pro quo test on section 5 
challenges withstands scrutiny.”).  
 146.   Levy, supra note 8, at 762–63. 
 147.   Hodes & Nauser v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 497–98 (Kan. 2019). 
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back to its traditional, highly defferential approach anytime soon.  This 
elevated level of review already played a critical role in the Kansas 
Supreme Court’s Hilburn decision and may similarly impact the Kansas 
Workers Compensation Act.148 
Injured workers challenging the Kansas Workers Compensation Act 
based on an infringement of their Section 18 right to a remedy have a fairly 
straightforward path to getting the Kansas Supreme Court to utilize a 
heightened standard of review.  The Act inherently infringes on Section 
18 rights because it strips workers of their right to pursue common law 
remedies against employers and coworkers.149  The Kansas Supreme Court 
has explicitly stated that Section 18 is a “fundamental constitutional 
right.”150  Therefore, following Hodes and Hilburn, the court should apply 
a heightened level of scrutiny when reviewing Section 18 challenges to the 
Act than it has in the past.  As detailed below, the Kansas Supreme Court 
has the perfect vehicle in front of it for replacing the Injured Workers test 
with a new workers compensation constitutional framework.151 
The Hodes majority applied strict scrutiny when analyzing a statute 
that infringed on a woman’s right to access abortion procedures, a right 
the court identified as fundamental.152  If the Kansas Supreme Court 
applied strict scrutiny to workers compensation, numerous provisions of 
the Act would likely be held unconstitutional.  Strict scrutiny applies such 
a high standard to legislation that it has been called a “virtual death-
blow.”153  Under strict scrutiny, a statute must “serve some compelling 
state interest and be narrowly tailored to further that interest.”154 
The Kansas Workers Compensation Act, at least in its original form, 
likely serves a compelling state interest.155  Workers compensation 
protects businesses from the risk of financial ruin due to high damage 
 
 148.   Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 526–27 (Stegall, J., concurring) (Noting that, over his dissent in Hodes, 
the court established a higher standard of review in “cases involving ‘fundamental interests’ under the 
Kansas Constitution” which is still controlling precedent.  Justice Stegall’s adherence to the Hodes 
precedent and subsequent concurrence was outcome determinative in Hilburn.).  
 149.   See Szymendera, supra note 15, at Summary. 
 150.   Ernest v. Faler, 697 P.2d 870, 874 (Kan. 1985). 
 151.   See Injured Workers of Kan. v. Franklin, 942 P.2d 591, 603–04 (Kan. 1997). 
 152.   Hodes, 440 P.3d at  466, 493–504. 
 153.   Michael C. Duff, Worse than Pirates or Prussian Chancellors: A State’s Authority to Opt-
Out of the Quid Pro Quo, 17 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 123, 182 (2016) (“the virtual 
rubber-stamp of truly minimal review . . . the virtual death-blow of truly strict scrutiny”) (quoting 
Richardson v. Carnegie Libr. Rest., Inc., 763 P.2d 1153, 1163 (N.M. 1998)). 
 154.   Hodes, 440 P.3d at 493 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S 306, 326 (2003)). 
 155.   See Duff, supra note 153, at 181 n.403 (providing statistics on the vast amount of workplace 
injuries taking place in the early 20th century when workers compensation schemes developed in 
America) (quoting JOHN F. WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE 
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 2–3 (2004)). 
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awards for pain and suffering or punitive damages in common law tort 
actions.  Simultaneously, workers compensation was meant to protect 
individual workers and their families from bearing the financial burden of 
injuries suffered while working.  This “Grand Bargain” can mutually 
benefit both sides and shift the burden of a social safety net for injured 
workers away from their family or government programs and onto the 
industry that profits off their labor.156  Instead of many workers suffering 
financial devastation after an injury, and a few recovering large sums of 
money, all injured workers and their families receive the security of 
reasonable guaranteed benefits.  Instead of businesses shuttering their 
doors due to one incident that results in a massive judgment, the cost of 
workplace injuries is borne out across entire industries in a predictable 
fashion through workers compensation insurance premiums. 
Although the Kansas Workers Compensation Act, in its original form, 
may serve a compelling government interest, it is doubtful that the current 
version of the Act is narrowly tailored enough to survive strict scrutiny.  
Many of the recent amendments were targeted at reducing or denying 
benefits for injured workers to cut expenses for employers and their 
insurance carriers.  These amendments are almost certainly broader than 
necessary to achieve the goals of providing employers with predictable 
costs and shielding them from sudden financial ruin.  However, one should 
also consider that holding large portions of the Act, or the entire Act, 
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny would have drastic practical 
consequences and cause massive uncertainty for employers and injured 
workers. 
Based on the opinions in Hilburn, the Kansas Supreme Court seems 
intent on avoiding this outcome.  Justice Luckert dissented in Hilburn in 
part because “a new analytical model [] would collaterally create 
uncertainty about the constitutionality of the Workers Compensation 
Act.”157  The Hilburn opinion commented on Justice Luckert’s concerns, 
assuring that striking down the noneconomic damage caps “on Section 5 
grounds would not cause the collapse of the workers compensation system, 
much less make it inevitable or imminent.”158  Fortunately, there is a 
reasonable rationale for strict scrutiny being too high of a standard when 
assessing Section 18 challenges to the Act. 
In Hodes, the majority focused on the type of rights being asserted 
 
 156.   Szymendera, supra note 15, at 3. 
 157.   Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 534 (Kan. 2019) (Luckert, J., dissenting). 
 158.   Id. at 520 (Beier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 
289 P.3d 1098, 1145 (Kan. 2012)). 
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when considering the applicability of strict scrutiny.159  Inalienable natural 
rights, which include life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, are rights 
that are inherently bestowed upon all individuals and are “not dependent 
upon the will of the government.”160  The Hodes majority found that the 
right to personal autonomy is an inalienable natural right that includes a 
woman’s right to make decisions about her own body, healthcare, and 
family planning.161  This led directly to the court’s application of strict 
scrutiny to the statute at issue.162 
In contrast, the right infringed upon by the Kansas Workers 
Compensation Act is the common law right to recover in tort action.  This 
right is a “fundamental constitutional right” that “is recognized in the 
Kansas Bill of Rights [Section] 18” and deserves a heightened level of 
scrutiny after Hodes.163  But the common law right to recover in tort action 
does not rise to the level of an inalienable natural right, such as bodily 
autonomy, that would require strict scrutiny.  The Kansas Supreme Court 
previously made this distinction in Farley v. Engelken when it considered 
the proper level of scrutiny to apply in a constitutional challenge to a 
statute restricting injured patients’ recovery in medical malpractice tort 
actions.164  The court in Hodes also noted, “[u]nder the facts [in Farley], 
which did not involve a natural right, the court decided to apply the 
intermediate scrutiny standard,”  a semi-heightened analysis lying 
between rational basis and strict scrutiny.165  The Kansas Supreme Court 
should apply this same intermediate scrutiny standard to the Act, which 
eliminates injured workers’ rights to sue their employer in tort. 
The Kansas Supreme Court should also distinguish its analysis of the 
Act from Hilburn, where the court held that the statutory cap on 
noneconomic damages in personal injury cases were a per se 
unconstitutional violation of the right to a jury trial under Section 5, which 
states that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall be inviolate.”166  Again, the 
 
 159.   Hodes & Nauser v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 472–73 (Kan. 2019).  
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court likely wants to avoid the chaos that would result from holding that 
Kansas Workers Compensation Act is a per se unconstitutional violation 
of the right to a remedy under Section 18.  The Hilburn court paid 
significant attention to the text of Section 5, specifically the word 
“inviolate.”167  Section 18’s text, which says “[a]ll persons . . . shall have 
remedy by due course of law,” is distinguishable from Section 5.168  
Section 18’s language does not indicate that any infringement on the right 
to a remedy is per se unconstitutional like the word “inviolate” does in 
Section 5.169  Section 18 only guarantees the right to a reasonable remedy 
to redress injuries through due process, not an inviolate right to a specific 
remedy.170  Therefore, the Kansas Supreme Court can maintain 
consistency with its Hodes and Hilburn fundamental rights approach, and 
avoid holding the Act per se unconstitutional by applying an intermediate 
level of scrutiny to the Act. 
To apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to workers compensation, 
the Kansas Supreme Court does not need to create a new framework from 
whole cloth.  It can look to the Injured Workers two-part test which asks: 
“(1) Is the legislative change reasonably necessary in the public interest to 
promote the general welfare of the state?  (2) Has the Legislature provided 
an adequate substitute remedy to replace the remedy that was 
restricted?”171 
The Injured Workers test has not failed Kansas workers because its 
structure is illogical, but rather because of the extremely low level of 
scrutiny it employs.172  Assessing part one of the test under rational basis 
is essentially a free pass to the Legislature allowing for post hoc 
rationalizations.  In Injured Workers, the State cited concerns about fraud 
based on a New York Times report compiled by employers and insurance 
companies that was later shown to have vastly overestimated the 
frequency of fraudulent workers compensation claims.173  The Kansas 
Supreme Court said the State’s concerns about this report sufficiently 
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showed strict reporting requirements—which would wholly bar some 
injured workers from benefits—served a valid state objective.174  The court 
went on to say that a statute “will not be set aside if any state of facts 
reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”175  This is an almost impossibly 
high burden for plaintiffs challenging a state action to overcome. 
Part two of the Injured Workers test, the quid pro quo analysis, has 
also been applied at much too low a standard of review.  As is, the 
precedent set in Injured Workers176 seems to be that so long as the 
Legislature leaves some crumbs for workers, they can give the rest of the 
pie to employers and satisfy quid pro quo standard. 
Some plaintiffs have argued that any amendments to the workers 
compensation statute need to come with their own quid pro quo.177  The 
Kansas Supreme Court rightfully rejected this argument.178  Requiring a 
separate quid pro quo for any amendment would likely gridlock the 
Legislature.  Legislators would hesitate to pass anything that is subject to 
a quid pro quo analysis, even if the statute is mutually beneficial to the 
parties affected and serves the greater good.  There would be a debilitating 
fear that the Legislature could never pare back benefits for either party if 
a statute does not achieve its intended result.  The Legislature should be 
permitted to try new ideas and correct its own mistakes on matters of 
public policy.  Instead of applying a separate quid pro quo analysis to 
amendments to the Act, the Kansas Supreme Court should continue 
reviewing the Act in its entirety, but under a heightened standard of 
review. 
A logical path forward is replacing the Injured Workers test with a 
similar two-part test that utilizes an intermediate standard of review.  The 
Kansas Supreme Court should consider borrowing language from the 
United States Supreme Court, by employing the words “substantially 
advance[s] legitimate state interests”179 and “rough proportionality.”180  
Although the United States Supreme Court used this language in cases 
involving government takings of private property under the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, they are a good fit for 
Section 18 workers compensation analysis.181  An injured worker’s right 
 
 174.   Injured Workers, 942 P.2d at 600. 
 175.   Id. at 602 (citing Leiker v. Gafford, 778 P.2d 823, 849 (Kan. 1989)). 
 176.   Id. at 604.  
 177.   See id. at 621–23. 
 178.   Id. 
 179.   Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
 180.   Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
 181.   Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
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to a tort claim against their employer can be considered a private property 
interest deserving of similar constitutional protections.182 
The United States Supreme Court developed a two-part test in cases 
where the government offered to issue land use permits it normally would 
have denied in exchange for an easement on citizens’ private property.183  
The government taking an easement without any compensation is clearly 
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment.184  However, the United 
States Supreme Court permits this type of permit-for-easement quid pro 
quo if: (1) the easement taken substantially advances the same state 
interest that would have caused denial of the land use permit; and (2) the 
easement taken and land use permit granted have roughly proportional 
value.185  This is very similar to the Injured Workers test.  Part one tests 
the purpose of a government action, and part two applies a quid pro quo 
test to an exchange of individual rights for a replacement remedy.  The 
difference is that the wording employed by the United States Supreme 
Court creates a level of scrutiny higher than the rational basis deference 
under Injured Workers, but lower than the strict scrutiny used in Hodes. 
The Kansas Supreme Court should replace the Injured Workers test 
with a new two-part test that reads: (1) Does the legislative change 
substantially advance a legitimate state interest?  (2) Has the legislature 
provided a substitute remedy that is roughly proportional to the remedy 
that was restricted?  Part one of this test would place the burden on the 
state to demonstrate that its action is substantially tied to a legitimate goal, 
instead of the virtual free pass allowed under part one of the Injured 
Workers test.  Part two would still be a quid pro quo analysis applied to 
the Kansas Workers Compensation Act in its entirety, but it would require 
something closer to an even balance of benefits for employers and 
workers.  This balance would not demand mathematical precision, but it 
would be a much higher standard than the “leave the workers a crumb” 
standard the Kansas Supreme Court applied in Injured Workers.186 
The Kansas Supreme Court granted certiorari and recently heard oral 
arguments in Johnson v. U.S. Food Services.187  The Court of Appeals 
holding in Johnson was limited to the 2013 amendment adopting the Sixth 
 
 182.   See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Legal Claims as Private Property: Implications for Eminent 
Domain, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 373, 376–402 (2009) (arguing that “legal claims are constitutional 
property”). 
 183.   Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827, 834; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377, 391. 
 184.   U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law”).  
 185.   Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.  
 186.   See Injured Workers of Kan. v. Franklin, 942 P.2d 591, 604 (Kan. 1997). 
 187.   427 P.3d 996 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018), cert. granted, No. 117725, 2019 Kan. LEXIS 140 at *1 
(Feb. 28, 2019); see also supra note 1. 
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Edition AMA Guides and simply severed this amendment from the rest of 
the Act.188  This creates a great opportunity for the Kansas Supreme Court 
to introduce this new test in its Johnson holding without slashing apart the 
entire Act and sending shockwaves through Kansas businesses and 
insurance providers, something the court likely wants to avoid. 
The Kansas Supreme Court should affirm the Court of Appeals 
holding in Johnson.  Johnson was decided prior to Hodes elevating the 
standard of review for fundamental rights.  So, in Johnson, the Kansas 
Court of Appeals applied the Injured Workers test under the traditional 
rational basis standard of review.189  Even under this low standard of 
review, the Court of Appeals held that the Kansas Workers Compensation 
Act was no longer an adequate quid pro quo because of how drastically 
the Sixth Edition AMA Guides cut benefits for workers.190  Overturning 
Johnson in a post-Hodes world would require the Kansas Supreme Court 
to either reverse course on Section 18 being a fundamental constitutional 
right or determine that the Court of Appeals decision was so off-base that, 
even under a heightened standard of review, the Act is a sufficient quid 
pro quo. 
Instead, the Kansas Supreme Court can affirm the Johnson decision 
and lay out a new workers compensation framework without making 
wholesale changes to the Act or causing chaos in the administrative 
workers compensation process.  By using Johnson to announce a new 
approach to Section 18 workers compensation challenges, the Kansas 
Supreme Court can send a message to the Legislature that the court is 
willing to claw back some rights for Kansas workers.  This warning shot 
would hopefully motivate the Kansas Legislature to proactively amend the 
Act and restore a roughly proportional quid pro quo.  If the Legislature 
fails to act, future injured workers could use the new two-part test from 
Johnson to challenge other portions of the Kansas Workers Compensation 
Act.  The Kansas appellate courts would almost certainly be receptive to 
some of those claims under a heightened level of review. 
B. Possible Section 5 Challenges to the Kansas Workers Compensation 
Act 
While Section 18 challenges are likely the best method for injured 
workers to attack the constitutionality of the Kansas Workers 
Compensation Act, an alternative route may be available.  Future plaintiffs 
 
 188.   Johnson, 427 P.3d at 1013–14. 
 189.   Id. at 1008. 
 190.   Id. at 1013–14.  
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might successfully argue that the Act also infringes upon their inviolate 
Section 5 right to a jury trial under the Kansas Bill of Rights.  To have a 
right to a jury trial, a plaintiff must first have a cause of action.  Therefore, 
there has been no reason to reach a Section 5 analysis in assessing the 
Act’s constitutionality because workers’ rights to a common law tort cause 
of action are eliminated.191  But, as previously discussed, the 2011 
amendments to the Kansas Workers Compensation Act added several 
fault-based provisions allowing employers to deny compensation to many 
injured workers.192  Many of these amendments place a burden of proof on 
the injured worker and convert workers compensation claims into a 
process reminiscent of a common law civil trial—minus a jury.193 
Under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act, findings of fact are 
made solely by an administrative law judge.194  An injured worker can 
appeal this decision within the administrative agency, then once 
administrative appeals are exhausted, they may appeal to the Kansas 
appellate courts.195  However, there is no point where an injured worker is 
entitled to have their claim heard by a jury of their peers, as they bypass 
the Kansas district courts.  The Kansas Supreme Court may have deemed 
this acceptable in the past because the Kansas Workers Compensation Act 
provided guaranteed and expedited benefits to injured workers, regardless 
of fault.196  However, the recent amendments have made the workers 
compensation benefits far from a guaranteed, no-fault form of recovery. 
In Hilburn, when trying to distinguish noneconomic damage caps on 
personal injury claims from the workers compensation scheme’s 
infringements on Section 5 and Section 18 rights, Justice Beier 
emphasized an allegedly low burden on injured workers compared to a 
plaintiff pursuing a common law tort remedy. 
[T]he comprehensive workers compensation system at issue in Rajala is 
totally distinct from the noneconomic damages cap . . . . [P]ersonal 
injury plaintiffs in Kansas are still required to file civil lawsuits; conduct 
necessary discovery; obtain required expert testimony; and prove 
negligence, causation, and damages to a jury by a preponderance of the 
 
 191.   Id. at 1003. 
 192.   Id. at 1005–07. 
 193.   See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-523, 44-549 (2018) (discussing administrative hearing 
requirements).  
 194.   Id. §§ 44-523, 44-549.  
 195.   Id. §§ 44-555c(a), 44-556 (2018). 
 196.   Johnson, 427 P.3d at 1003 (quoting Howard Delivery Serv. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 
651, 662–63 (2006)) (“[W]orkers compensation . . . involves a classic social trade-off or, to use a Latin 
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benefits regardless of fault.”). 
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evidence.197 
While these distinctions between a civil suit and a worker’s 
compensation claim were potentially accurate in the past, that is arguably 
no longer true after the 2011 amendments to the Kansas Workers 
Compensation Act.  This language was intended to counter the dissent’s 
argument that the Hilburn decision spelled the end of workers 
compensation in Kansas.198  While Justice Beier is likely correct that the 
Kansas Workers Compensation Act will not be eliminated, many of its 
recent amendments create the same burdens for injured workers that she 
listed for personal injury plaintiffs. 
Although injured workers do not file a civil lawsuit, they must give 
their employer notice of their injury and file an application for a hearing 
within specified timeframes that are analogous to a statute of 
limitations.199  At the hearing, an administrative law judge considers 
relevant evidence presented by employees and employers, typically in the 
form of expert witness opinions, then awards or rejects benefits.200  If 
injured workers are not satisfied with the outcome, they must appeal 
within the administrative agency, and then, potentially to the Kansas 
appellate courts.201  To obtain an award for future medical benefits, 
employees typically must hire medical experts.  To meet the prevailing 
factor test and show a work accident or repetitive trauma was the primary 
cause of injury,202 a showing very similar to the causation standard for 
common law negligence, a worker may have to hire experts and conduct 
factual investigations resembling discovery.  Finally, an administrative 
law judge determines monetary benefits based on factual findings about a 
worker’s percentage of impairment and, when work disability is available, 
potential future earnings, which often requires a vocational expert.  Injured 
workers, many of whom are unemployed at the time of the administrative 
hearing, must protect their right to a remedy for their injury by engaging 
in this expensive battle of the experts with their employer’s insurance 
company. 
By implementing procedural hurdles and fault-based defenses and 
placing ever-higher burdens of proof on injured workers, workers 
compensation claims in Kansas have moved closer to common law 
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negligence claims, rather than a method for providing guaranteed and 
expedited benefits to injured workers.  Again, the Legislature can amend 
common law remedies.  But the Legislature has not merely amended a 
remedy—it has essentially recreated a common law remedy within an 
administrative agency where injured workers are stripped of their Section 
5 inviolate right to a jury trial.  If the Kansas Supreme Court accepted this 
argument and followed Hilburn by refusing to apply a quid pro quo test to 
Section 5 challenges, some of the recent amendments to the Kansas 
Workers Compensation Act imposing these hurdles and burdens on 
injured workers would likely be facially unconstitutional.  The court could 
use the Act’s severability clause to strike down challenged portions of the 
Act that impose these procedural hurdles on injured workers and avoid 
holding the entire Act per se unconstitutional.203 
IV. CONCLUSION 
By applying the low rational basis standard of review, the Kansas 
Supreme Court has historically granted the Legislature significant leeway 
when reviewing statutes that infringe on constitutional rights.  This has 
allowed the Kansas Legislature to enact amendments to the Kansas 
Workers Compensation Act over the past thirty years that are radically 
pro-business and hurt Kansas workers and their families.  In Johnson, the 
Kansas Court of Appeals pushed back against the Legislature and held that 
its most recent amendment to the Act is facially unconstitutional.  Through 
the Kansas Supreme Court’s subsequent opinions in Hodes and Hilburn, 
the court raised the standard of review applied to statutes infringing on 
fundamental constitutional rights.  This was a significant shift by the 
Kansas Supreme Court that may, and as this Comment argues, should, 
impact the Kansas Workers Compensation Act very soon.  The Kansas 
Supreme Court should use Johnson to replace the Injured Workers test 
with a similar two-part test that employs an intermediate level of scrutiny.  
Adopting this approach would stop the state Legislature’s systematic 
decimation of workers compensation benefits, even the playing field 
between employers and injured workers moving forward, and preserve the 
benefits afforded to both sides under the “Grand Bargain.” 
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